PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAMl IS perhaps one of the most interesting texts of the older Nyaya indis- pensable to the understanding of the system. This is not because the ideas expressed therein were not to be surpassed at a later pe- riod, but because in it the development of the school appears fixed, as it were, in a "transitory moment" (transitorisches Moment), and we see there for the first time that line of thought, which historically took form in the Nyaya philosophy, becoming aware of itself in
Nbh. Nyayabha~yam(Poona Oriental Series edition).
NV. Nyiiyavarttikam (Kashi Sanskrit Series edition).
Ybh. Yogabhasyarn (we quote the patafijalayogasutrabha~yavivaral).am,Mad- ras Government Oriental Series, No. 94).
1The Nyayabha~yam, a detailed commentary to all parts of the NS, was written by Paksilasvamin Yatsyayana about the 2d half of the 5th century A.D. The date of this work can be ascertained from the fact that no trace of the logic of syllogism of Dignaga (480-540 A.D.) can be found in it, while the Yogabhasyam and the Sarpkhya teacher Vindhyavasin (1st half of the 5th cent. A.D.) seem to have been known to it. The importance of Paksila- svamin's Nbh. as basic text of the old Nyaya is especially clear from the fact that it was repeatedly commented upon even up to the 9th century.
Thus we know that Bhavivikta (about 520-580 A.D.) wrote a Tik1i to the Nbh., as did also Aviddhakarna. The Nyayavartikam of Uddyotakara is likewise a commentary to the Nbh. Probably the Rucitika of Adhyayana al- so dates from this period. Even in the later period there were commenta- ries on this work. Thus we hear of a Nyayabha~yatika of Visvariipa and of a work of a similar name of Vacaspati Misra's teacher Trilocana (about 770-830 A.D.). From the large number of these commentaries, which spread over a period of about three centuries, it is plain, to what great extent the work of Paksilasvamin was esteemed in the old Nyaya school. Such a work which occupied the best thinkers of the school for centuries could not have gone by without leaving its influence on the system and on the way in which the system determined its own nature. It must have acted as a catalyst for the development of the school, giving to it, at least in its fundamental concepts, its particular tum.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 303 a clear, though archaic, manner. Furthermore, if we bear in mind to what extent such an interpretation of a school (given by itself) determines its development, the importance of Paksilasvamin's text for the history of Nyaya cannot be over-estimated.
The history of Nyaya begins with a relatively old vada tradi- tiorf which consisted of a certain number of concepts and doctrines that were gathered from the practice of disputations. These topics of the Vada doctrine did not form a homogeneous system of con- cepts but were drawn up for practical purposes and on the basis of practical experience.' Hence, this Vada doctrine cannot be con, sidered as a consistent, theoretical science, and in no case as a philosophical system.
It came to be a philosophical system only when an old school of philosophy .of nature took up this Vada doctrine and handed it on further together with its doctrine of liberation.' In my article on the vada traditions of India I have tried to show that the oldest Nya- ya work, which might have been the oldest core of the Nyayasii- tras (Adhyayas I and V), must have already undergone an elabo- ration, because from a philosophical point of view,' the arrange- ment of topics, usual in a Vada exposition, were changed. To this must be added another reason, namely, that the relatively de- tailed explanation of the cosmological doctrine of liberation in the first Adhyaya of the NS is unusual in a pure vada exposition and,
2Cf. G. Oberhammer: Ein Beitrag zu den Viida-Traditionen Indiens.
WZKSO, Vol. 7 (1963), especially pp. 63-74. (Abbreviated in this paper as
3This is clear from the choice of the 16 topics (pad'iirth'Ul}) of the NS or the collection of the Tatis and Nigrahasthlinas, which show no sys- tematic choice or order, but are obviously lists of faults met with in the practice of disputations. This can be seen from a detail, namely, from the category of fallacious reasons (hetv7ibhasa!J.) , which in their logical structure dolnot tshow a: common principle of definition and are not found in con- texts, where one would have expected them. For they are mentioned nei- therrin connection with the" 'logical reason (hetu1}) nor in connection with the enumeration of the Nigrahasthanas . (NS V, 2, 24).
4This cosmological doctrine of liberation isalrea,dyfound in . the earliest beginnings of the NS, namely, in NS I, 1, 1-2, andI; I, 9-22. Cp. Note 6.
SViida-Traditionen, p. 71 f.
therefore, points to a philosophical elaboration of an old Vada exposition.'
If we compare this elaborated text, which must have been the first real text of the Nyaya school, with the version of the NS which Paksilasvamin comments on, we see that this oldest Nyaya work (=Adhyayas I and V of the NS) was enlarged according to the cosmological interest of the school.' On the other hand, no essential enlargement was made in the sections on the real Vada categories, except in the case of the philosophically important ca- tegory of the Pramanas," Thus, we see a clear trend of development from the Vada doctrine to a cosmological doctrine of liberation.
6If we compare Caraka's Vada exposition with that of the NS, we find that the earlier V'ada expositions might have had included as topic also a system of metaphysical concepts, appearing in the NS as Prameya.
This system of concepts could vary from school to school and was, so to say, inserted in a special place of their V'ada exposition, which, within the leading V'ada traditions, must have been the same for different philosophical systems. Thus we find in Caraka's exposition the six categories of the older Vaisesikam, while in the case of the V'ada text, which forms the basis of Adhyayas 1 and 5 of the NS, a cosmological doctrine of liberation (NS I, 1, 9-22) was inserted. Through this insertion and the rearrangement of the topics (Cf. Note 5) must have come into being from a Yada exposition that oldest Nyaya work, which roughly corresponds to Adhyliyas 1 and 5 of the NS (Cf. W. Ruben: Die Nyayasiitren, Leipzig 1928,p. XV). Together with this adaptation of the V'ada text also NS I, 1, 1-2must have been added, which must have been likewise absent in the old \'ada text, since the prob- lem of liberation was a philosophical problem and not proper to a \'ada doctrine.
7We are justified in assuming the cosmological interest of the school not only if we start from the hypothesis that Adhyayas 3-4 of the NS are amplifications made by the teachers of the school, but also if we start from the theory that the teachers of the Nyaya school at a particular stage had amalgamated the work of a cosmological school with the NS of Adhyayas 1 and 5 (perhaps also 2). This last hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that Tucci has found Siitras of Adhyayas 3 and 4 of the NS not quoted as Nyayasutras even in the 4th century. Cf. G. Tucci: Pre-Dinnliga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p, XXVII ff.
8NS II, 1,8; II, 2, 12.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 305 Now the problem arises as to why this development did not final- ly lead to a total subordination of the logico-dialectical problems, as it happened, for example, in the case of the oldest Vaisesika system, which had never integrated in its doctrines a Vada doc- trine, though it must have known and possessed such expositions of the Vada-doctrine for the practice of school debates," This is all the more important since the logico-dialectical categories of the old Vada text were not necessarily topics of the cosmological doc- trine of liberation of the oldest Nyaya school, and consequently could have easily been disposed of or subordinated as methodology to the system, as was done with the Tantrayuktis or Vada doctrine in Caraka. The reason why this was not the case seems to lie, among other reasons, mainly in the interpretation of the school as given to it by Paksilasvamin,
Viewed historically, Paksilasvamin's introduction to Nyaya- bhasyam marks the final stage of the attempts of the Nyaya to jus- tify the objective value of knowledge, in general, and the sixteen categories of the school, in particular, against the criticism of cer- tain Buddhist schools. This justification is contained in the first part (Nbh. 1, 1-2, 8) of the introductory chapter.
Starting from the fact of the ability to act (pravrttisamar- thyam),lO Paksilasvamin, on the supposition that knowledge of a
9Though the \/ada exposition in Caraka, or more precisely the \/ada exposition which ought with the greatest probability to be assumed as its prototype, may not necessarily have been such an exposition, yet it shows that there were 'Vada expositions which were closely connected with the Vaisesika school. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the presence of Vaisesika categories in Caraka's \/ada exposition.
10This idea reminds one of the "arthakriyil" of Dharmakirti (600- 660 A.D.) from which this thinker deduced the validity of he means of knowledge.
thing must be acquired through the means of knowledge," concluded that the means of knowledge-contrary to the view of Nagarjuna and his school-convey an objective knowledge and hence are objec- tively valid: "The means of knowledge are objectively valid be- cause they are capable of inducing activity (which, being a fact of experience, cannot be called into question) only when the knowledge of things is gained through them."12 This starting-point is further elaborated by Paksilasvamin, He divides the entire
"truth about things" (arthatattvam) into four fundamental cate- gories, namely pramnaam (means of knowledge), pramiitii (the cognizing subject), prameyam (object of cognition) and pramitilt
11That this principle was not part of the original \'ada text, but originated from the cosmological doctrine of liberation that was connected with it, and consequently could be rightly conceived as a doctrine of the oldest Nyiiya, can be gathered from the fact that the importance of the Pramanas expressed there stands in clear opposition to the real position of the Pramanas in the available Yada texts, where it usually has only a subor- dinate importance. Furthermore, the re-arrangement of the topics of the old Yada text, as we have shown (Cf. Yada-traditionen, p. 71 ff.) becomes clearly understandable, if one assumes that this principle was one of the fundamental ideas of the cosmology of the old Yada text; for if this cosmo- logical doctrine of liberation maintained the view that everything will be or must be known through the Pramiinas, then the doctrine of the Pramanas ought to have been treated at the beginning of the exposition of the school doctrine. The view that the principle "pramiinatas carthapratipattih," which Paksllasvamin emphatically brings forward a·t the beginning of his Nbh., belongs to the cosmological doctrine of the liberation, can be strengthened by the fact that this principle is a literal quotation from the later cosmolo- gical sections of the NS, where it occurs as NS IV, 2, 29.
In this connection it may be pointed out that this principle suggests the idea that the philosophical school which had fused its cosmological doctrine of liberation with a \'ada text and thus had become the school of Nyiiya, was identical with that school against which Nagarjuna polemi- zes in his Vigrahavvfivartani and which commonly is rightly considered to be the school of Nyaya (Cf. Yada-Traditionen, pp. 64-72). It is thus pro- bable that the later cosmological parts of the NS did not originate in a school other than that old cosmological doctrine of liberation, which had been contained already in the oldest part of the NS (NS I, 1, 9-12).
Whether that school was always known as "Nyliya" or whether Paksi- Iasvfimin associated this name with the Siitras he commented upon, must remain an open question for the present. The fact that Siitras of the cos- mological parts of the NS were quoted as Vaisesika-siitras, testified to by Vasu in his commentary to Aryadeva's Satasastram (Cf. Tucci: Pre-Din- naga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. XXVII ff.), as well as the fact that Paksilasvlirnin himself in his introduction to the Nbh. en- deavors to determine his science as doctrine of nyaya and anvik~iki,seem to point to the second possibility.
12Nbh., p. 1, 5.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 307 (cognition)." These four categories are necessary elements for the knowledge of things (arthapratitih.) without which there is no ca~
pacity to act. Hence, if the knowledge of things, as shown, is really obtained through the means of knowledge, then also the remain- ing three categories must have an objective value: "If the means of knowledge have an objective value, then also [the categories like] cognizing subject, object of cognition and cognition have an objective value. Why? Because the knowledge of a thing is not possible, if one of these [categories] is missing. .. these four [ca- tegories] contain the entire 'truth about things' [arthatattvam]."14 Hence, the "truth about the things" as a whole is proved to be objectively valid.
In order to show the objective value of the "truth about the things," Paksilasvamin divided it into the four above-mentioned categories. As a next step, he determined-from another stanting- pomt the contentof this truth about the things: "What is this truth?
The bemg of the existent and the non-being of the non-existent.':" In doing so Paksilasvamin obtains an important starting-point, defined in itscontent, which enables him to prove the validity of the sixteen categories of theNyaya,For, if one leaves aside the negation of being, the truth about things-fundamentally already proved to be valid- consists in the being of the existent. The truth, apart from negation,
13Nbh., p. 1, 14-16. The classification of reality into these four groups is no: found in the NS, but Paksilasvamin makes this classification on pur- pose in order to bring the existent in a necessary relation with cognition.
This division might be traced back to an older doctrine of the school; for Paksilasvarnin mentions this classification in Nbh., p. 268, I as one of the possible classifications of reality and polemizes against its being taken absolutely. Besides, we meet with this same classification of reality in pramiinam, pramilt71, prameyam and pramitili also in the commentary of Kaundinya to the Pasupatasutras, but increased by the category of pramdpa:
yit71, which corresponds to God. The absence of this fifth category could be taken as a hint to the fact that Paksilasvarnin himself was probably no pa:- supata. This commentary knows of a doctrine of inference, which funda- mentally agrees with a commentary of NS older than the commentary of Paksilasviirnin (Cp. "Yada-Traditionen" p. 97 ff.). Hence it is not probable that this commentary took over this classification of reality from Paksila- svamin.
14Nbh., p. 1, 12-16. Here I deviate from the translation of these lines of G. Jha, who seems to follow an interpretation of this passage by Uddyo- takara, but does not do justice to the idea.
ISkim punas tattvam? satas ca sadbhdvo 'satas cilsadbnava1J.. Nbh.
p. 1, 17; 2, 1.
is nothing else than the existent, correctly and objectively cognized as such." It is precisely this existent (sat) which is expounded in the sixteen topics of the Nyaya : means of knowledge (pramar;.am), object of cognition (prameyam), doubt (samsayah.), purpose (pra- yojanam) , example (dr~(anta!J), theory (siddhiintah), syllogism (avayava!J) , methodical consideration i tarkah.), decision (nirna- ya!J), discussion (vada!J), debate (jalpa!J), wrangling (vitar;.4a), fal- lacious reason (hetvabhasa!J), quibbling i chalah}, false rejoinder (jati!JY and reason of defeat (nigrahasthiinamvl' Inasmuch as Paksilasvamin had, therefore, proved the validity of those neces- sary conditions of the cognition of a thing, namely, pramdnam, pramdtii, prameyam and pramatih,he had also shown that six- teen topics of the Nyaya were valid; for .these were nothing else than the four conditions of possible cognition of a thing seen from the point of view of what they are.
Through this interpretation of the sixteen topics of the school as classifications of the existent Paksilasvamin had furthermore claimed-at least in nuce and implicitly-that these sixteen purely accidental categories of the school are consciously deduced topics of one science and that this science was a philosophical system, and not a mere "organon" of logic and dialectics. This claim ma- nifests itself clearly in the attempt of Paksilasvamin to determine the doctrine of his school from a double point of view, on the one hand, as nyayavidya (doctrine of nyaya!J) and, on the other, as a- dhydtmavidyii (philosophical doctrine of liberation), understanding this double determination in the sense that the Nyaya represents an Adhyatma-doctrine which is worked out with the help of rational method (nyaya!J).
For whatever reasons it might be Paksilasvamin identifies his science with the Anvik~ikimentioned by Kautilya in his Arthasas- tra," Ifhe, therefore, makes statements about this Anvlk~iki,they can safely be considered as applicable also to his own system.
Now, he states expressly .that the Anvlk~ikiis nydyavidyii since it
16sat sad iti grhyamiinam yathdbhiitam avipar'itan.t tattvam bhavati.
Nbh., p. 2, 1-2.
17sac ca khalu -?oqaJadha vyiidham upadeksyate, tasa1!l khalv asan.t sadvidlidniim pramalJaprameyasan.timyaprayojana dr-?tantta siddh antavayavatar- kanirnayaviidajalpavita1!qahetviibhiisacchala
=jutinigrahaSithananiin.t taitvaiiid- nan n'ilJsreyasudhigamalJ.. Nbh., p. 2, 8-12.
18Cf. P. Hacker: Anviksikf (WZKSO, Vol. II (1958) pp. 67 ff.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 309 works with anviksii, which he identifies with nyaya!J/9 Thus, the nyaya!J in the broadest sense of the term (both as pramdnair arthapariksanam and as syllogism which Paksilasvamin characteriz- es as paramo nydyah.) is the typical method and, as will be shown, an essential topic of his science. Primarily and basically, how- ever, the Nyaya is an Adhyatma-doctrine : "Knowledge of the truth, (tattvaieiinamv;" writes Paksilasvamin, "which serves as means for the attainment of the highest good, must be understood in ac- cordance with the science in question. Here in the case of the Adhyatma doctrine, however, is the knowledge of the truth, know- ledge of the truth about the Atma etc.; by attainment of the highest good is (to be understood) the attainment of Iiberation.'?" Thus, for Paksilasvamin, his science is in a double sense the Anviksiki:
first, i~smuchas it works with the method of nyiiyal; and tea~hes
it; and secondly, inasmuch as the Anvik~ikiis Adhyatma doctrine,"
Through this double identification, Paksilasvamin could de- termine the specific nature of his science in such a way that the categories of the NS, gathered originally as accidental topics of a
\'ada manual', appears as a coherent system of philosophy: "These four sciences (transmitted by Kautilya), each of which has its own formal object, has been taught for the sake of living beings.
The fourth of these is the Anviksiki or the science of Nyaya (nya- yavidyii), Its specific objects are the topics "doubt," etc. With- out their separate enumeration it would be, like the Upanisads, 19Apart from the explicit identification (Nbh., 3, 16, f.), this follows from the fact that he uses the definition of the method of the Anvik~iki given by Kautilya in his Arthasflstram, namely tt. • • hetubhir anvik~amii
1Jii .. ." in order to determine the concept of nyii)'a~1. According to Paksila, svamin this nyaYaJ:! is pramdnair arthaparlksanam. The new term pramiina is evidently a synonym for the term hetuh used by Kautilya. Caraka defines the concept of hetuh. simply as upalabdhikilranam, ~hich·he explains as praiyaksam, anumiinan, aitihyam and aupamyam, i.e., as means of know- ledge (pram711Jam). Caraka then continues: ebhir hetubhir yad upalabhyate tat tattvam. (Carakasamhita, Vim. 8, 33). Hence we can be certain that in their early period the concepts 'pramiinam' and'hetuh' had identical signi- ficance. Thus Paksilasvarnin has not at all changed the content of the de.
finition of nyiiyalJ. through the use of the term pramiinam. I am therefore inclined to make precise P. Hacker's interpretation of anviksli as "Unter- suchen mit Grunden" (inquiry with reasons) in the sense that it is "an in- quiry with the help of the means of knowledge" ("Untersuchen mit Hilfe der Erkenntnisgrunde). Cf, P. Hacker: Anviksiki, p. 66.
20Nbh., p. 7, 7 f.
21On this aspect of Anvll,-~ik'i cf. P. Hacker: Anvlk~ikl, p. 73 f.
only an Adhyatma doctrine."22 If we bear in mind that Paksila- svarnin did characterize his system as Adhyatma doctrine, then here cannot be denied that the Nyaya is an Adhyatma doctrine, but only that it is a mere Adhyatma doctrine like the Upanisads. Just be- cause it is an Adhyatma doctrine, it requires specific topics like the categories "doubt," etc. for being a science of its own.
Thus, Paksilasvamin marks for us that stage in the history of the Nyaya where .the trend of its development, starting from a pure Vada doctrine, is transformed into a clear and conscious form of Adhyatma doctrine. It is true that already, at the beginning of this development, when NS I, 1, 1 had introduced the oldest work of the school, the system of concepts handed down in the old
\'ada tradition had been changed into a philosophical system. Yet, in spite of this change, the topics of the Viida tradition still re- mained the most extensive and the most emphasized part of the system: "From the knowledge of the truth about the means of knowledge, object of cognition, doubt, purpose, example, theory, syllogism, methodical consideration, decision, discussion, debate, wrangling, fallacious reason, quibbling, false rejoinder and reason of defeat, proceeds the attainment of the highest good.'?'
In this introductory Siitram an attempt is in fact made to in- tegrate the system ofVada topics into the liberation-doctrine of an old cosmological school, though in a most superficial and external manner; for it is only the second Siitram which brings this libera- tion-doctrine to the forefront. But in doing so, it neglects com- pletely .the topics of the Vada doctrine: "Liberation follows there- from, that pain, birth, activity, defect and false knowledge cease, each (member of the series) ceasing at the cessation of that which immediately precedes it"," Regarding the question on how the contents of these two Siitras are to be combined, or what necessary role the ¥ada topics of NS I, 1, 1 have to play in this system of liberation, we are completely kept in th dark. Paksilasvamin, on the contrary, has with full consciousness emphasized the aspect and importance of the Nyaya philosophy as liberation-doctrine restricting the basic thought of NS I, 1, 1 to the idea that it is only the knowledge of the Prameya like Atma etc. which brings about liberation, and not that of the dialectical categories: "Happiness, indeed, is attained through the truth about the Prameya (objects
22Nbh., 3, 5-8.
23NS, I, 1, 1.
24NS, I, 1, 2.
PAK!?ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA!?YAM 311 of cognition) like" Atma etc.... ; for it is only when these four ca- tegories (padiirthiilJ) are completely known, namely heyam (that which is to be avoided), tasya nirvartakam (that which causes it), iityantikam hdnam (absolute avoidance), tasyopdyah. (the means thereto) and adhigantavyah. (that which ought to be attained), that one attains the highest happiness."25
That Paksilasvamin purposely restricted the liberating know- ledge to the knowledge of the truth about Atma etc. is seen, among other reasons, from the strange division of Prameya" into these four Moksa-categories, which are entirely foreign to the Nyayasiitras, Therefore, if Paksilasvamin,nevertheless, applies them to the Nyaya category of Prameya, it can only mean that he intended to demon- strate and confirm the fact that his Nyaya system represented a real liberation-doctrine; for the division into these four categories is not restricted to this single passage, but occurs in a second one too, though somewhat less clearly expressed. This shows that their use was not a momentary fancy of Paksilasvamin, but was indeed based on the idea he had himself formed about the philo- sophy of his school. In his commentary on the cosmological Sii- tras dealing with knowledge and liberation, he writes: /I • • • If the unhappiness (duhkham) is known, it will be avoided (prahi1Jam) ... in the same way, one knows that the faults (do~alJ)and the deed (karma) are the causes of unhappiness iduhkhahetuh') ... Thus one comes to the view that (the topics) like rebirth after death (pretyabhavalJ), fruit (phalam) and unhappiness (dulJkham) are to be known, and deed (karma) and faults (do~iilJ) are to be avoided (praheya~1),that the liberation (apavargahv is that which ought to be attained iadhigantavyah') and that the means to its attainment iadhigamopiiyah ) is the knowledge of the truth (tattva- jiiiinam). Thus, a person who constantly applies himself to, and studies and reflects over the objects of knowledge, which are divid- ed in this fourfold manner," gains a complete knowledge (samyag-
25Nbh., p. 2, 16-3, 2.
26This category comprises: soul (atma), body (sariramv, sense or- gan (indriyam) , sense object (arthak), thought (buddhiJ;z), inner organ (manas), action (pravrttilJ.) fault (do.~alJ.), life after death (pretyabhava1J), fruit of action (phalam), unhappiness (dulJ.kham) and liberation (apavargalJ.).
Cf. Ns, I, 1 9-22. The key-words of this category contain the entire old cos- mological doctrine of liberation.
27By that is meant: 1) jneyam (=pretyabhliva-phola-duhkhamv; 2) praheyam (=karma and do.~ah
=duhkhahetuh.v ; 3) adhigantavyah. (=apa- vargahv; 4) tasyop"i1yal} (= tattvaiiiiinam).
darsanamy, knowledge (of things) just as they are (yathabh'Utava- bodhahy, knowledge of the truth (tattvajiianam)."28
In both the above-quoted passages we have the same division into four categories. Yet this division cannot be considered as proper to the system of Nyaya, For, firstly, it is nowhere to be met with in the Nyayasiitras : and secondly, it cannot be easily ap- plied to the content of the category mentioned as "prameyam,"
The last difficulty seems to have been felt by Paksilasvamin him- self, because in the passage last quoted there is no category of hii- nam to be found, so that the division consists only of praheyarn, adhigantavyak and updyah, while in the first passage'" there are, really speaking, five categories, and not four, as Paksilasvamin pre- tends: heyarn, tasya nirvartakam, hdnam, upiiyak and adhigantavyah, This is clear from the fact that in the second passage, adhigantav- yaij is to be taken as a category of its own, namely apavargah. Thus, in order to obtain the fourfold division, heyam and tasya nirvarta- kam had obviously to be taken as one, which it was not, according to the original conception. Paksilasvamin seems therefore, to have taken over this division from a liberation-doctrine, where only the fourfold division was used. This doctrine of liberation, which made use of these four categories, can really be traced back: it is the Yoga of Patafijali, The source whence Paksilasvamin took over this division seems to have been the Yogabhasyam, There we read: "Just as the medical science is divided into four (parts), namely sickness, cause of sickness, health and means of health, so also is this system (the Yoga of Patafijali) divided into four, namely,transmigration (san;zsaraij), cause of transmigration (san;z- siirabiiah, liberation (moksak) and the means of liberation (mo-
~opayah). Of these, transmigration, which is full of pain, is the Heya, the union of prime matter and spirit, the Heyahetu, the complete cessation of this union the Hana, and the right know- ledge (samyagdarsanam), the Hanopaya.'?'
A comparison of this passage, with the division of Paksilasva- min, shows a clear dependence. Both. are acquainted with the category of heyam - in the first passage of Paksilasvamin as hey- am, while in the second, it appears as praheyam, by which is
28Nbh., p. 288, 10; 289, 4.
28aSee footnote 25.
29Ybh., p. 168, 3-7.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 313 meant the heyahetuli (=do~alf and karma). In the same way, the category of heyahetuh is found in both the texts. In the first pas- sage of the Nyiiyabhasyam Paksilasvamin explains it as tasya (=heyasya) nirvartakam, while in the second passage it appears as duhkhahetult (=praheyam). He mentions the concept of hii- nam only in the first passage of his Nyayabha~yam,while in both passages, he mentions the category of upa.yalf.
Though there is a fundamental agreement between Yogabhas- yam and Nyayabha~yam,there are differences which ate important for the understanding of the relation of both the texts." First of all, it is worthy of note that in the series of concepts in Paksilasva- min the concept of adhigantavyan appears, while it is absent in that of the Yogabhasyam. Secondly, the concept of hiinam appears in Paksilasvamin only in the first passage (Nbh. 2, 17.) but it is absent in the second. Finally, on close study, one finds a certain disagreement in the interpretation of the concept of upiiyah, In the first passage, it appears as means for the hiinam, while in the second, where the concept of hiinam is absent, as means for the attainment of apavargah, i.e., as means for the adhigantavyah (Nbh. 289, 2). All these disagreements seem to be connected with the concept of hiinam, which puts Paksilasvamin into difficulties while applying it to the Nyaya category of Prameya.
What is the interpretation given to this concept in the Yoga of Patafijali, from where Paksilasvamin took the concepts heyam, heyahetuh, hdnam and tasyopdyah? In the Yogabhasyam, the con- cept of hiinam is defined as "complete cessation of the union (be-
30The disagreement that results from the application of these four categories within the Nyaya doctrine will be still clearer, if we consider the interpretation given to them by Uddyotakara, who attempts to bring them in agreement with the Nyaya doctrine: "By 'heyam' is meant unhappi- ness (du~kham); 'tasya nirvartakam' is ignorance and longing (avidyatr~
ne), dharma and adharma ; 'h'Unam' is knowledge of the truth; 'tasvopii-
yal!, is the Sastra and 'adhigantavyah' is liberation (moksah)' (NV. p.
12, 5-6). This interpretation testifies that Paksilasvamin really enumerated five, and not four, categories. Further it shows how problematic the classi- fication of the category of Prameya in these four Yoga-categories was: for firstly, Sastram is no prameyam according to the NS; and secondly Uddyo, takara's interpretation of these categories differs from that of Paksilasvli- min. In the second passage (Nbh., p. 289, 1-2), where Paksilasvamin speaks of these categories, tattvajiidnam is not at all to be equated with 'h7inam,' but with'upayah: which Uddyotakara had interpreted as Sastra, though Pa, ksilasvfirnin makes no mention at all of it in this connection.
tween spirit and prime matter)."31 In a second passage, this idea is more clearly expressed: "hiinam is the absence of the union (of spirit and prime matter) on account of the absence of this [ignor- ance]. This [hiinam] is the emancipation of the spirit [dr~e~ kai- valyam]. [With this Siitram is meant that] on account of the absence of ignorance [adarsanam] the union of the intellectual organ [buddhi!J.] and spirit [puru~a!J.]is absent. [In other words]
there is absolute cessation of bondage. This is the hiinam, this the emancipation of the spirit.?" From this definition of hiinam, in terms of the Samkhya metaphysics of the Patafijala-Yoga, it is clear that this concept signifies nothing else than liberation trnoksah'y.
Thus it is easy to understand, why in the Yoga series of these four concepts there is no other term for liberation. Consequently the Patafijala-Yoga defines the means to attain liberation as "right knowledge" (samyagdarSanam),33 Le., "unshakable knowledge of the difference [between spirit and prime matter]."34 Such an interpre- tation of the concepts hdnam and hdnopiiyah, however, was not possible within the framework of the Nyiiya philosophy, and thus Paksilasvamin must have had to give a new interpretation to these concepts. And this he did. He could keep the term updyah, but givingit the Nyaya sense of means for the attainment of apavargak (= adhigantavyah'i, In doing so, he also gave a new interpreta- tion to the term samyagdarsanam by changing its original sense of "knowledge of the difference between spirit and prime matter"
into that of tattvaiiidnam, that is to say, "knowledge of the truth about the objects of cognition [prameyiini, not padiirthiik !]."
There was, however, no equivalent for the concept of hiinam.
Hence Paksilasvamin avoided it when he expressed his own thoughts (Nbh. 288 ff.) and let it remain only in that place where
31'Hiinam' is the absolute cessation of the union (between prime mat- ter and spirit). Ybh., p. 168, 8.
32Ibid., p. 203, 5-8.
33Ibid., p. 168, 8.
34vivekakhyiitir aviplavahanopa)'af}, YS., II, 26.
PAKSILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHASYAM
. .315 he made a more or less explicit reference to the Yogabhasyam,"
Since the Yoga term hdnam was not suited for characterizing the Nyaya concept of apavargah, Paksilasvamin endeavored to in- crease the concept-series of the Yoga (heyam, heyahetuh, hiinam and hdnopiiyah') by one more concept, adhigantavyah, which, on the testimony of Paksilasvamin himself, has to be taken in the sense of apavargah,
From the foregoing inquiry, we come to an important result:
Paksilasvamin makes a conscious effort to apply to the "Nyaya cate- gory of Prameya, the categories of liberation of the Yoga of Patafi- jali, This he does in connection with the claim that the Nyaya as Adhyatma doctrine leads to liberation through the "knowledge of the truth about the Prameyas such as Atma, etc." Why does he do so? The only sensible answer is, that the Yoga of Patafijali was at that time held to be the model doctrine of liberation, and hence allusion to its terminology seemed best suited to strengthen Pa- ksilasvamin's claim that his school represented a real liberation- doctrine (adhyatmavidya).
In this way, Paksilasvamin had certainly shown that the Nyaya, as an Adhyatma doctrine, was a genuine philosophical system and not a school of mere dialectical techniques. Yet, he did not suc- ceed in determining his science from the philosophical point of VIew In such a way that its difference from other philosophical systems was made clear.
35This is textually attested to through the use of the term samyag- darsanam in this connection: et7ini catvdry arthapad7ini samyagbuddhvii ni1].- sreyasam adhigacchati. Here the agreement of the word samyagbuddhv7i with the world samyagdarsanam is not fully convincing, though very proba- ble, when taken with the foregoing enumeration of the four categories from Ybh., p. 168, 4 ff., which is evidently an inexact quotation. (In Nbh., 289, 4, on the contrary, samyagdarsanam. is expressly identified with tattvaiiidnam:
. . " prameyam ... bhiivayatah. samyagdarsanam yath7ibhiitavabodha.s tattva- jfianam utpadyate). To show that Paksilasvlirnin (Nbh., p. 2, 17; 3, 1) really gives an inexact quotation, 1 would like to put forward the parallelism of hanam Iiryantikam (Nbh., p. 3, 1) and samyogasy7ityantiki nivrttir h7i- nam (Ybh., p. 168, 8) as also the use of samyagbuddhv7i (Nbh., 3, 1) which reminds one of h7inopaya1]. samyagdarsanam in Ybh., 168, 8. Another import- ant reason for it seems to be the fact that Paksilasvfirnin speaks of four categories, but he really enumerates five, though by omitting h7inam, which in fact did not fit properly in the Nyliya context, he would have easily got the four categories. It is true, in doing so, these four categories would no more have been the same as in the Yoga. Thus we can conclude that Paksilasviimin did want to mention the Yoga categories and that he there- fore' quoted the Yogablisyam.
The starting point for such a determination can be found in two remarks which Paksilasvamin makes while he identifies his science with the Anvik~iki. There, he observes that the Anvik~iki, and consequently also his science, is a nydyavidyd"and explains this idea in the second passage, where the Anviksiki is said to be iinviksiki or nydyavidy7i because .it operates wi\th anviksii (=ny7i- yaiJ).37 In other words, the starting point for the determination of the nature of his science is, for Paksilasvamin, the idea already mentioned: that the Nyaya represents an Adhyatma-doctrine.
which operates essentially with the niethod of nydyaiJ,38 i.e., a ra- tionally worked out Adhyatma- doctrine. This idea is, after all, not new. It was already implicitly contained in the attitude of the oldest Nyaya tradition, as we find it in NS I, 1, 1 and 2, and this must have been one of the reasons why this old cosmologically oriented doctrine of liberation integrated into its system an expo- sition of Vada doctrine. Besides, this. attitude is not even typical for the oldest Nyaya : it is already found in a developed form in the still older system of Sarpkhya, which was a genuine Adhyatma- doctrine and operating so much with rational method, that its fol- lowers could be characterized as tiirkikdh. What is new is the fact that Paksilasvamin, starting from this determination of his science, endeavors to show the old categories of the vada doctrine as an integral part of the Nyaya. In doing so, he therefore preserves these categories in the tradition of his school, in as far as he shows them as necessary topics of the system.
The starting point of this demonstration is, as mentioned already, the determination of Nyaya as a rationally worked out liberation-doctrine. The dominating idea of this doctrine is the
"knowledge of the truth" (tattvajfuinam). By this is meant not only the topics (padiirtha/J.) of the Nyaya being the knowledge of the truth as determined in its content, but also the knowledge of the truth in as far as it is movement of thought, as spiritual event obeying objective norms. Hence, those topics of Nyaya explaining and analyzing the knowledge of truth as movement of thought are also to be considered as necessarily belonging to the topics of Nyaya, and not only the categories of Pramana and Prameya which needed no further justification.
36Nbh., 3, 6.
37Ibid., 3, 6-4, 1.
38Cf. P. Hacker: Anvik~ikip. 70 ff.
PAK~ILASV;UVl:IN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA:?YAM 317 Thus in the last part (Nbh. 3, 3; 7, 6) of his introduction to the Nyayabhasyam Paksilasvamin shows why the old dialectical categories, whose quality as necessary topics is called into ques- tion, are yet to be considered as constitutive topics of the Nyaya ; for even if they are not necessary topics of Nyaya as Adhyatma doctrine, they all stand in a necessary, or at least proportionate, relation to the knowledge of truth as movement of thought, which is a necessary aspect of Nyaya as Anvlk~iki. This relation is infer- red either as a method of this knowledge of the truth taken as nyiiyalJ. and its conditions of possibility," or as form of this know- ledge so far as it is result, namely, theory (siddhiintalJ.) and deci- sion (nir1J-ayaIJ.), or as means of dealing with the knowledge of the truth within or between the schools, namely as viidah. and its con- ditions of possibility,"
Viewed systematically and historically, the group of topics containing the nyiiyah. and its conditions of possibility is the most important. According to its general structure, the nyiiyan as me- thod is the inquiry into an object with the help of the means of knowledge ipramdnair arthapariksanamy, Syllogism, the highest form of nydyah, also is such an inquiry with the means of know- Iedge," Thus the nyiiyalJ. is the only and indispensable method which corresponds to the basic view of the Nyaya, that a cogni-
39These are the topics: doubt, purpose, example, syllogism and me- thodical consideration.
40These are the topics: discussion, debate wrangling, theory, falla- cious reasons, quibbling, false rejoinder, and reason of defeat.
41For Paksilasvamin syllogism was not yet, as it was for the logic after Dignaga, formalization of inference (anumiinams, but a fixed schema for the inquiry into an object with the help of the means of knowledge. I hope to elaborate this idea in another context. Here I shall only refer to the remark of Paksilasvamin in which he expresses the nature of syllo- gism succinctly: "In the verbal formulation consisting of the totality of the members of syllogism, the Pramiinas (!) prove the objects because they (correspond to the respective members of the syllogism and, corresponding to them) depend on each other" - avayavasamudUye ca viikye sambhii- yetaretardbhisambandhdt pram7i1J.any artham. s7idhayanti (Nbh, 50,10-11). In this short remark the expression itaretarilbhisambandhdt (because they depend upon each other) points to the fact that the syllogism is to be considered as a formal schema while the expression sambhiiya (correspond- ing to them) shows that the nature of syllogism consists in the inquiry with the help of Pramanas, because the pratijiia corresponds to sabdaJ:!, the hetuh. to anumdnam, the uddharanam to pratyaksam and the upanayah.
to upamllnam (Nbh. 50, 11-51, 4).
tion can be had only with the help of the means of knowledge (pramal1atas cdrthapratipattehi and thus enables the school to be Anvlksiki, rational Adhyatma-doctrine." In as far as certain topics (padarth01J) of the Nyiiya are conditions of possibility of the method proper to the school, they too should be considered as ne- cessary topics of the school doctrine. Paksilasvamin offers such a demonstration in connection with the nyiiyaIJ with regard to doubt (san:zsayalJ.), purpose (prayojanam), example (dr!?tiintalJ.) and syllogism (avayavQ4): on principle, the nydyah. can be applied only to something which is cognized in a preliminary cognition as existing, but which is not yet conceptually determined in its
"what": "the nyiiyah. is applied neither to an unknown thing nor to a thing known for certain, but to a doubtful thing.':" Hence, doubt (samsayah.), "that knowledge, which consists in a mere con- sideration of an object ... without determining it,?" is a necessary condition of the nydyah. as its occasion and should therefore be considered as a necessary topic of the system. In the same way is purpose (prayojanam) a necessary condition of the nydyah, since as motive inducing a person to act, it extends to every activity.
Therefore, "the nyiiyalJ. takes place in dependence upon it."45 While both the hitherto discussed topics of the Nyayasiitras were condi- tions of the nyiiyah. as an existential philosophical act, the cate- gory of example (drsfiintalJ.) is necessary condition of the nyiiyalJ.
as a logical structure. "( Only) in dependence upon it is the
42In addition to the method of nyaya~ is a second method, namely, methodical consideration (tarka~)which is, according to the NS, I, 1, 40 "the examination (iihalJ.) of an object, whose truth is not yet known by means of the given reasons with a view to know the truth." Paksilasvamin justi, fies it as topic of the Nyaya as follows: "The methodical consideration does not belong to the means of knowledge, nor is it an additional means of knowledge. It is a help for the means of knowledge and it is meant for the knowledge of the truth (tattvaiiidniiya kalpate) (Nbh., 5, 15). It is thus clear that the tarkah stands in close relation to inquiry with the help of the means of knowledge, and hence it is to be considered necessary for the nyayavidya as methodical scheme of inquiry. Cf. also Paksilasvlimin's im- plicit identification of nyayaJ:z with tarkah, when he says: "The nyayalJ. is applied to something doubtful; as has been said: 'Decision (nir1J-aya~) is the ascertainment of the object by means of statement and counter-statement consequent upon a doubt'." (Nbh., 3, 9f.). Decision is, however, the result of tarkah ; for the result of nyayalJ.in the strict sense of syllogism (=avayavalJ.) is the nigamanam. .
43Nbh., 3, 9.
44Ibid., 3, 12.
45Ibid., 3, 14-16.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 319 process of nyayal]. possible.':" This becomes plain, if we bear in mind, that Paksilasvamin takes his stand on the logic of analogy, in which the conclusiveness of an argument can be known only by its example. For only if "(an example) is given, are inference and verbal cognition (anumanagamau) possible; if it is missing, they are not possible.':" Finally, the syllogism (avayaval].) requires no further justification as necessary topic of the Nyaya doctrine, since it is the highest form of nyayal]. itself", Paksilasvamin con- nects it in a double manner with the topics of his school: "It is only through (syllogism) that discussion (vadal].) debate (jalpal].) and wrangling (vitat;u!a) take place, and in no other way. In de- pendence on it is the ascertainment of truth.':" Thus, the nyayal].
is not only constitutive method of the Nyaya to ascertain the truth, and consequently necessary condition of the Nyaya as Anvik~iki, but likewise a means of dealing with the truth in philosophical exchange of ideas.
Thus, a group of topics (padarthal].) must be subjected to inquiry, which, though of minor importance from the systematic point of view, yet is not less typical from the historical point of view due to its broad treatment in the Nyayasiitras, namely, the vddah. and those categories which Paksilasvamin deduces from it as necessary topics of the Nyaya. Paksilasvamin had deduced the nydyah, and through it the categories subordinated to it, from the knowledge of truth (tattvajnanam) as movement of thought, and thus justified their necessity. In the same way, he deduced also the necessity to deal with the topic of vddah, the philosophical ex- change of ideas. For while nydyah. was the method of the knowl- edge of the truth, viidah. was for Paksilasvamin the very movement of thought itself, which leads to the knowledge of truth: "Deci-
46Ibid., 5, 1.
48Ibid., 5, 12. It may be observed in this context that Paksilasvamin in several places endeavors to bring the concept of nyaya,! in relation with cer- tain categories of the NS, not only to show that they are necessary topics of the system, but especially to interpret the concept of the nyaya~ into the ca- tegories of the NS, where it does not occur at all. For this purpose he had to identify theavayaval]. through an appropriate interpretation (namely, through the relation he established between the members of syllogism and the means of knowledge) with the nyayah of the Anviksiki and to declare the avaya- val]. to be the highest nyaya~. It seems, therefore, possible to assume Paksilasvamin's school could be designated as "Nyaya" only because of his interpretation of it as nyayavidya (=anvik~iki).
49Nbh., p. 6, 8.
sion (nirtJayal[.) is the knowledge of the truth, the fruit of the means of knowledge. With it ends the Vdda (tadavasiino vridah)".50 Here the school of Nyaya clearly appears as intimately connect- ed with the Vada tradition. The knowledge of the "truth about the things," which was considered as leading to liberation, needed from the systematic point of view, in no way to be connected with the vddah, the philosophic exchange of ideas. Yet the philosophic exchange of ideas is a historical fact in the school of Nyaya. It characterizes that type of striving after truth which, from the begin- ning, had been a habitus of the school, and was as such not only typical, but also necessary for the manner in which the Nyaya sought for truth. The philosophical exchange of ideas was for the Nyaya thinker Paksilasvamin, in fact, that movement of thought, which ended with the knowledge of the truth. Vada is fundament- ally that macro-structure of dealing with the truth, in which nyiiyal[.
has its proper place.
The nydyah, as understood by Paksilasvamin, is primarily the inquiry of an object with the help of the Pramanas, and hence it is not quite clear, whyit should have an essential relation to the Yada, and why the \'ada, in its turn, should be that superposed whole, in which the nyiiya!J. had its original and proper place. Yet, if one bears in mind that Paksilasvamin designates the inquiry with the help of the Pramanas as nvdyah, as did Kautilya, and that he con- siders syllogism (avayaviil[.) as the highest and the most proper form of nydyah, a closer relation between the nyiiyal[. as method and the phenomenon of Vada reveals itself. According to Paksila- svamin, syllogism is an assemblage of verbal expression, by which the proof of a thing is accomplished," and as such it belongs es- sentially to the reality of Vada. This relatedness extends itself also to a more essential aspect; for Paksilasvamin defines Vada as an assemblage of verbal expressions of several speakers (niinii- pravaktrkah. . . vdkyasamiihah ) requiring a proof (=syllogism) with regard to each object (pratyadhikaraI'Jasridhana1J.), in as far as it should terminate in a decision, i.e., in the ascertainment of the truth.? Thus, Vada and nyaya.1[. (=syllogism) stand in a necessa-
50Ibid., p. 6, 8.
5!Ibid., p. 5, 9 and p. 50, 10.
52Ibid., p. 6, 11-12. It'is not surpnsmg that, for Paksilasvfimin, the scientific method of nyayah is so closely related to the Viida, since knowl- edge of truth was striven ~fter to a great extent in oral discussions, rather than through the help of books as is the case with the procedure of modern science.
PAK~ILASVAMIN'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS NYAYABHA~YAM 321 ry relation to each other: it is nyiiyah. which makes Vada to be that movement of thought which leads to the knowledge of the truth, while the nyayaf} as verbal expression belongs essentially and originally to the Vada, without which it would not be possi- ble. If, therefore, nyayaf} is that method which constitutes the Nyaya philosophy, and further, if the Vada is that historically giv- en milieu for the search of truth, in which the method of the nyayaf} must be applied, then it will be absolutely clear that all those categories of the Nyayasiitras," which define and explain the phenomenon of Vida and give it its norm, could not only not be suppressed in the Nyaya philosophy as understood by Paksila- svamin, but, historically speaking, are constitutive and necessary elements of the system.
In this paper, whose aim is to ascertain the idea Paksilasva- min had regarding the nature of Nyaya as a philosophy, it is not necessary to show in detail how he brings each of these categories in relation with the Vada. It is enough to sum up the main re- sults of this study:
1. Paksilasvamin considers the Nyaya as a rationally work- ed out and rationally working doctrine of liberation iadhyiitmavid- ya), and hence he identifies it with the Anvik~ikiof Kautilya. In doing so, he makes explicit the conception which the school of Nya- ya had regarding its own nature, namely, the conception of the school as a philosophical system, and not merely as logic or dia- lectical doctrine.
2. The element that constitutes this philosophy is the ratio- nal method of nyiiyah, and as such, it had not only to be applied, but also to be taught and studied as topic of the system. The Nya- ya is, therefore, also doctrine of nyayaf} and of the logical and dia- lectical categories conditioning this nydyah,
3. In accordance with the old school tradition, the method of nydyah, for Paksilasvamin, is primarily the syllogism, namely syllo- gism as verbally expressed in discussion, and not as formalized infer- ence; for inference is itself a Pramana, and not an inquiry with the help of Pramana, Therefore, the process which leads to the attainment of truth is, really speaking, the Vada working with syl- logism. From this historically given situation follows that the Nyaya, in as far as it is the doctrine of nyaYaIJ,is necessarily to be considered also as a doctrine of Vada and its conditioning cate- gories.
53Ct. Note 40.
Through this threefold unfolding of the nature of 11.yayal]., as Paksilasvamin carries out in his introduction to the Nyayabhasyam at the occasion of the justification of the categories of the Nyaya- siitras, he has not only definitively formulated an old development of idea within the school, but through the explanation of this na- ture, he has also determined the further development of the Nyaya, whose aspect of Adhyatma-doctrine began to fade more and more into the background," while the specific and formal aspect of Nyii- ya as science of nydyal; and of vddali comes more and more into the foreground, until in the Navyanyaya this is the only important aspect. Thus Paksilasvarnin can be considered, in a somewhat in- accurate generalization, to have been the most important thinker of the old Nyaya, perhaps even of the Nyaya in general, not be- cause his theories were not surpassed in later times, but because it was he, who - as far as we know - brought the Nyaya to its self-knowledge and thereby to the knowledge of itself as a real science.
54This aspect slowly disappeared through the gradual fusion of the Nyaya with Vaisesika from about the 17th century A.D. when there existed prac- tically only the combined school of Nyiiya-Vaisestkam.