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Vol. 05 No. 3, December 1967.tif


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To his left and right is another master in the middle of the rows. REPORT OF THE JOURNEY OF AL'\1 SENT TO THE WEST 421 and inspect a prison under the jurisdiction of the judge.


Kang's criticism of The Good Earth was way off the mark, but could easily be accepted by Pearl Buck as a minority opinion. However, Lin Yutang and the majority of Chinese intellectuals defend the accuracy of The Good Earth.


Many members of the JCP were intellectuals, better read in the Marxist Classics than understanding Japanese society. In 1949 the Party won almost 10% of the vote, won 35 seats in the House of Representatives and became the fourth largest party.


The Japan Quarterly errs in stating that this system works in favor of the LDP. In the same election, the JSP is said to have spent only 11% of the LDP's estimated expenditures. The cited material shows that the JSP also loses because of the participation of the CGP in politics.

In the period 1958-60, around fifty percent of the JSP members in HOR had a trade union basis. A fifth and incomparable asset of the LDP is the prosperity that the Japanese enjoy today. A good illustration of the benefit to the LDP from this factor is the alienation of the young Japanese voter from the JSP.

Table  1.  Results  of  30th  and  31st  General  Elections,  HOR
Table 1. Results of 30th and 31st General Elections, HOR



This was opposed particularly passionately by the Dravidian South, and the spectacular defeat of the Congress in Madras was almost entirely due to this issue. Another concern raised by the new structure is that of increasing political instability, especially in some of the states. Of the other powerful parties outside the Congress, the support and activities of the D.M.K. are confined to Madras.

It is currently the third largest party in the Union Parliament (35 seats) and has the second largest number (264) of total seats in state legislatures.


The Distortion of Formal Analysis

In the West, although there are large differences, local and/ .. or state governments have been stronger than they are in developing areas in general, and much of the total "amount" of corruption has occurred at this level. By comparison, therefore, national governments in the West may appear less corrupt than in the new states, since local units were an equally attractive source of plunder in the West. In this context, the weakness of interest structures together with the personalistic character of political loyalty allows national leaders to formulate policy without the many constraints imposed by party interest groups in the Western environment.7.

My point is simply that much of the articulation of interests in the new countries has been neglected because Westerners, accustomed to their own policies, have been looking in the wrong place.

Rational Impulses to Corruption

However, I would like to suggest that what we have called corruption represents an effort - albeit an informal one - by the political system to deal with. Thus we can see corruption as an index of the separation between the social system and the formal political system; a subversive effort by the social system to bend the political system to its demands. The very nature of the formal political system puts the unorganized and minority communities at a huge disadvantage, so that their interests are rarely represented in the content of legislation.

It is important to understand that the conservative effects of corruption are a direct result of the fact that corruption places influence in the hands of individuals and groups who are most likely non-participants in the formal political system/8 say corruption. is conservative to the extent that it is democratizing.

Parochial-vs-Market Corruption

Later, the growth of broader loyalty leads to an increase in involvement in the formal political system and, consequently, to a decrease in the level of corruption. In the short run, competing political parties are more likely to respond to incentives that motivate their party than to change the nature of those incentives. In addition to the power holder, be it a politician or bureaucrat, who always benefits as a necessary partner in the transaction, the nature of the beneficiary largely depends on whether the power holder is more strongly motivated by the loyalty of parochials. relatives, friends or ethnic group, or it is more impersonal and market-oriented.

South Vietnam would tend to fall into the "parochial" category under Diem, given the favoritism shown by Northern Catholics; the Philippines would approach the "market" variety of corruption, while Thailand should be called a "mixed" system.

Political Competition and the Beneficiaries of Corruption Two other important factors which determine who profits from cor-

In the table we assume that realistically those persons and groups closely identified with members of the ruling elite will always benefit to some extent from corruption. Moreover, the Philippines is already seeing the growth of institutionalized means of rewarding voters and the consequent decline of more particularistic, illegal rewards—a process that much of the West has already experienced. The transfer of rewards from an informal to a formal political system – from illegality to legality – thus presupposes certain changes in the nature of the electorate.

The institutionalized political appointment of local postmasters and the appointment of cadets to the armed forces academies are examples of the same process in the United States.

Distortive Corruption: The Private Sector

Both pre-coup Indonesia and Burma have opted for a predominantly state-run economy, while Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have imposed fewer restrictions on the private sector. Despite the best intentions and a declared policy of economic growth, state-run economies have fared significantly worse than those where the private sector dominates. This suggests that Southeast Asia is not an exception in this respect.28 If this analysis is correct, it follows that corruption, which ensures greater freedom of operation for the private sector, will, other things being equal, promote economic growth.

The incentive for such corruption would naturally be lower if government policy imposed fewer restrictions on the private sector.

Effects of Political Competition on Corruption and Growth Leaving aside for the moment the question of how effectively govern-

The few restrictions on private sector activity in the three most successful countries have been partially tarnished by corruption – the Philippines and Thailand would rank quite high on anyone's scale of corruption – while the ever-widespread corruption in Burma and Indonesia is none the less. managed to provide protection. protect the private sector from state control or state operations. But since we're talking about the real world, where most new countries tend to severely restrict or eliminate the private sector, "market" corruption may well increase the opportunities for economic growth. The fact that in competitive political systems it is more likely that voters are among the beneficiaries of corruption implies that corruption here is less conducive to growth – which is, incidentally, the same – than corruption in an uncompetitive political system in which voters are not among the beneficiaries of corruption. beneficiaries belong. ries.

This is not to say that corruption in the midst of political competition necessarily slows economic growth, but rather that it is not as likely to promote economic growth as strongly as corruption in an uncompetitive environment.29.


In this context, businessmen would prefer a predictable corruption system that assures them of the service or decision they are paying for and that sets known limits on the costs they will have to bear. So the greater the magnitude of corruption (the cost of a decision) or the greater the uncertainties associated with it (the risk factor), the less likely it is that corruption by the wealth elites will have a positive effect on economic growth. However, some transactions can actually limit or distort market forces and have a negative impact on economic growth.

Economic growth is more likely to be delayed than accelerated when corruption follows this pattern.

Corruption and Growth

This list is, of course, far from exhaustive, although it does represent many of the key considerations involved in determining whether corruption will have a net positive or negative effect on economic growth. As this black market approaches "perfection" in this sense, it is more likely to contribute to economic growth. The kind of corruption that most accelerates economic growth favors the wealthy elites and largely excludes voters and those with parochial ties to the elite from the market.

One might say that Congo would be better off with corruption that increased political integration, while Tunisia or the Philippines would be better off with corruption that increased economic growth, regardless of the potential economic benefits of market corruption.


The members of the cooperative were also given the opportunity to participate in the management of their association. Royal Law Government (RLG) officials and Lao people's belief in the possibilities of cooperatives. In the long term, it can greatly help in the overall development of Laos' economy.

This will include, among them, the education of the peasantry and the development of a market economy.


Indeed, the two most comprehensive accounts of the major urban centers of the region were published by D. All but one of the major Philippine and foreign banks have their headquarters in the area. For summary accounts of the historical impact of the Indian and Chinese cultural traditions in Southeast Asia, see D.

4 2 For a more detailed description of the pattern of pre-Hispanic settlement in the Philippines, see Robert R.


See John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959). Upon their arrival in the archipelago, the Spanish were repelled by the decentralization of the intensely independent barangays. George Kubler, Mexican Architecture of the Sixteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), Vol.

JOHN FRODSHAM is Professor in the Department of Chinese, School of General Studies, Australian State University.


Table  1.  Results  of  30th  and  31st  General  Elections,  HOR
Table  2.  Election  Predictions  by  Newspapers  and  Parties
Table  3.  Percentage  of  Votes  Won  by  Parties  in  the  Seven  daitofuken  (Metropolitan  areas)  70
Table  4.  Number of  Districts  in  Which  Percentages  of  Votes  Lower  Than  in  1963,  by  Parties  90

Mga Sanggunian


will not be assigned; √ constant discussion of the nature of and reason for class requirements and their relation to the learning outcomes of the student; √ adoption of a stance