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THE ASIAN CENTER

The ASIAN CENTER, originally founded as the Institute of Asian Studies in 1955, seeks to implement the statement of national policy, Section 1, R.A. No. 5334: "to develop... contact with our Asian neighbors in the field of learning and scholarship to attain knowledge of our national identity in relation to other Asian nations through ... studies on Asian culture, histories, social forces and aspi·

rations." The ASIAN CENTER was proposed as early as 1957 by President Ramon Magsaysay; in 1968, it was signed into law by Pres- ident Ferdinand E. Marcos upon the active encourag~;inent of Pres ident Carlos P. Romulo of the University of the Philippines. Today, with augmented facilities and staff, it offers facilities for conducting studies and sharing the results of research on Asia among Asian scholars. Primarily a research unit, the ASIAN CENTER also ad- ministers a degree program leading to the Master of Arts in Asian Studies with four alternative general areas of concentration: East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and West Asia. A specific area of concentration is the Philippines in relation to any of these four areas. The program of study is ·designed to provide training and re- search on Asian cultures and social systems on the basis of an un- dergraduate concentration in the social sciences, humanities, or the arts, and seeks to develop an area or regional orientation, with a multidisciplinary approach as the principal mode of analysis. The CENTER publishes two journals, a Newsletter, a monograph senes and occasional papers, in its publications program.

ASIAN STUDIES

Volume XI, Number, December 1973 Lilia S. Ledesma

Iuue Editor Rhoda T. Cristobal

Editorial Auistant

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CONTENTS

Asia and the Humanities Cesar Adib Majul

1

A Divisible and Graduated Peace . . . 13 Estrella D. Solidum and Roman Dubsky

The Chinese in Southeast Asia: China Commitments and Local Assimilation . . . 37 Llwellyn D. Howell, Jr.

China's Diplomacy Through Art: A Discussion on Some of the Archaelogical and Art Finds in the People's Republic of 1China . . . 54 Aurora Roxas-Lim

Hunting and Fishing Among the Southern Kalinga . . . 83 Robert Lawless

Unity and Disunity in the Muslim Struggle ... 110 Samuel K. Tan

Images of Nature in Swettenham's Early Writings: Prolegomenon to a Historical Perspective on Peninsular Malaysia's Ecological Problems ... 135 S. Robert Aiken

Sugbuanon Drama: A Preliminary List of Plays Acquired by the University . . . 153

Wilhelmina

Q.

Ramas

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Articles published in the Asian Studies do not necessarily represent the views of either the Asian Center or the University of the Philippines.

The authors are responsible for the opinions expressed and for the accuracy of facts and statements contained in them.

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CEsAR AmB MAJUL

I

Historically, the attitudes and responses of the Western. world towards the various Asian humanistic traditions have been a function of various needs. In a very important sense, the shift in these needs represents a progressive transformation from particular to relatively expanding universal ones. Significantly, such an expansion :has been

accompanied by a proportionate increase in its spiritual dimensions.

In the ·eighteenth century as well as the beginning · of the nine"

teenth century, knowledge of Asian humanities among Westerners was confined to those interested in the exotic or hitherto unknown sources of wisdom. Some European intellectuals have even used this know- ledge as a critique of what they believed constituted intellectual or moral complacency among their contemporaries. Such knowledge widened in scope later on when missionaries were led to deepen their studies of Eastern moral values and religious beliefs as part of their efforts towards more successful proselytizing. Often, unsuccessful missionaries returned to their ho~e base to end up as ~xperts on different sorts of oriental religions while preparing. others to take their places at home and abroad. The imperialist powers, too, had . their experts not so much to know the weaknesses of their subjects, who had been conquered mainly by force, as to make their n;lie more effi- cient and tolerable. Thus it is no accident that some of the most mo- numental compendia of Islamic Law or their translations used in India were produced un~er tbe patronage of British ruler~.

After World War II, the almost universal trauma resulting from.

widespread destruction and immense loss of lives, the fear of a nuclear war as well as a genuine desire for world peace, t4e rise of many in- dependent countries from colonial status, new political realignments

*Paper prepared for an international conference on the Humanities held at Bellagio, Italy August 5-10, 1974, under the ·auspices of ·the Rockefeller Foundation.

. 1

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2 ASIAN STUDIES

among nations, and a new concept of international relations not en- tirely devoid of the expectations for a one-world in the very distant future, made imperative the knowledge of the ideologies of other coun- tries as well as the moral and religious values which might have en- tered into the formulation of such ideologies. Cultural centers, ex- change programs, cultural missions, scholarships etc., became the order of the day. But such programs, although allowing an increased num- ber of Westerners to know more about Asia, had probably enabled more Asians to know more about and even imbibe Western values to the extent that many of them have come to question if not abandon, some of their own traditional values. In any case, a basic premise behind all the above programs and missions was that knowledge of the culture of another country would hopefully moderate, if not eli- minate, obstacles ·to friendlier relations along political lines or at least

avoid misunderstandings in negotiations among different statesmen.

In the last few years, problems of overpopulation, pollution, mal- nutrition; illiteracy, etc., have become universal in their import and implication. However, programs sponsored by developed nations or world agencies to help other nations have often met a cultural wall, generating, probably unwittingly, misunderstanding if not outright hostility. The misunderstanding as well as the resulting resentment have often been brought about by experts from the developed countries of the West whose prescriptions could not fit into the value systems and social institutions of the countries they meant to help. Conversely, suspicions about or imputation of unnecessary motives to such experts may have been the result of ignorance of other cultural values than their own. All these obviously point to the necessity for a widening and an intensification. of the knowledge of other cultural values on the part of experts as well as on that of the population where problems of world import are to be resolved. The burden of knowledge ought to be everyone's concern and not be placed merely on the shoulders of the experts.

It 'is important to note that alongside the shifting needs of West- erners to know Asian values, there have been sincere efforts by many universities, especially those in the United States, to include courses on Asian humanities in their liberal arts curriculum. But this program was meant to enrich the lives of the students and accelerate their creative impulses while enabling them at the same time to understand more deeply and appreciate their own culture through a comparative

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knowledge of other cultures. The Conference on Oriental Classics held at Columbia University in 1958 bears out this observation well. Al- though members of the conference spoke of the "intrinsic value" of some of the Oriental Classics while giving secondary importance to their historical value, and emphasized that the problem of the Western humanities was understanding better "humanity . in Asia" or "disco- vering the essential humanity in various civilizations", the aim of the existing or proposed academic programs was the intellectual . growth of the students. In effect, the higher institutions of learning h;ld pro~

duced an elite which had a fair understanding and even empathy for the cultural values of other peoples. However, when some members of this elite come to .occupy high positions in the state, how . much of their previous education in the past facilitate their task of improving the relations between their country and another Asian one?

Undoubtedly, the enrichment of a person's intellectual life, un- derstanding among peoples of each others' cultures, the cultural com- petence of experts charged with the explanation and· implementation of programs of world import, and the the facilitation of channels of communication so necessary to peaceful relations between nations are all desirable and ought to be encouraged. However, it is problematical

whether all of these desiderata, if realized, can radically or ultimately solve problems urging immediate solutions like the danger of a nuclear holocaust and that of dwindling raw materials and· their· unavaila- bility or high cost.

Undoubtedly, the great powers do not presently desire a nuclear war, especially one where all will be the losers. But it is not idle to speculate that should one of them be absolutely sure of emerging totally victorious from such a war with negligible losses on its side that it will not restrain itself from going into it. The point here is that the fear of a nuclear war among the great powers does not result from corn- passion for the people of the rival power and a love for human race, but because their own nationals stand in danger of extinction. In brief, the fear of a nuclear war is a function of national interests and does not stem from humanistic considerations based on universal prin- ciples. Based therefore on pragmatic and partisan principles, the desire for a state of no-war, euphemistically called "peace", cannot endure for long should other exigencies· demand otherwise.· · It is· instructive to note that many years ago there w·ere nations who, not yet possessing a nuclear· bomb, had demanded

a

ban on all nuclear armaments o·n

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4 ASIAN STUDIES

the basis of peace and humanity~ However, the moment they were able to produce an atomic blast, they conveniently forgot all their past mo"

ralizing. The great powers, in turn, condemned such a blasting as:

if only they had a monopoly to kill on a large scale.

The problem of raw materials as dramatically shown in the last energy crisis all point to the necessity for the existence in the not too far away future of a common pool of world resources and even of ser- vices for the benefit of all mankind, from which countries can draw on

the basis of urgent needs and priorities. At present, most help to de- veloping countries from rich or developed countries have been done on the basis of historical or friendly relations or with the inevitable attached strings. This is not to deny that genuine needs of a particular country are being satisfied through the aid of another friendly country;

but the point here is that there is the probability that there is another country in more urgent need for the particular aid granted. The fact is that countries having much needed resources which they can spare actually manipulate them in terms of national interests and power po- litics. Forgetting that the recent Arab use of the oil weapon had been based on techniques learned from the West, some quarters in the West have demanded that all Arab oil should be internationalized for the benefit ·of mankind in general. In principle this demand is, I believe, rational and good, provided that all other nations in the world inter- nationalize their raw materials, their technical knowledge as well as their surplus agricultural and industrial products.

At present, it is quite difficult to convince a person who is sop- histicated in the knowledge of international relations that international

agencies 1ike the World Bank are not influenced by the very rich na- tions who have ocntributed to its capital. It is much harder to convince him that as the rich nations become richer, the developing countries do not become relatively poorer. For example, in the last few years, export products from the West to Asia had, in some cases, jumped up to 300%

in their prices while, for many years until the October War of 1973, the prices of raw materials from Asia and Africa had remained more or less stationary. This means that the highly industrialized countries and international cartels have become richer while the developing countries exporting raw materials have become relatively poorer. In response to the demand for higher prices for thdr raw materials on the part of the developing countries, the industrialized countries had planned an orga- nization of consumers to present a united front. In the face of· all these,

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the United Nations-Secretary General reflected that there was need for agreement on c;ertain gt;neral principles which. ensure a rising standard of }iving for the developing countries while guaranteeing. continued eco- nomic security for the developed ones. But as long. as nations wiU ad-·

here to their ·claims to their own resources and make their specific ·de-' mands regarding trade and tariff arrangements and accessibility to other markets, and as long as the developed nations will, as a reaction, band themselves into an economic block to maintain their primacy in the international economic sphere, conflict between bJocks of nations will be chronic in increasing proportions and with dangerous · implications.

However, should some .form. of understanding be arrived at in ac- cordance with the view of the Secretary-General, all what this, means is that only some developing countries but most industrialized countr~es will profit from it. Indeed this does not necessarily imply that the.

whole of mankind will benefit from such an arrangement~

The idea of having a world agency where the surpluses of raw:

materials and agricultural and industrial products are registered or deposited and from which any nation can draw in accordance with its needs under a system_ of priorities,

will

never be possible unless all the.

peoples of the world begin to develop a sense of common direction as well as a set of universal values transcendinK those. of_ particular na- tipns and particular cultures. _ln brief, no concept of a world commu-_

nity can be both mean.ingful a1;1d operatjve un}ess it. is based on ·a set of universally held values. I take it that this is ~ne of the ·p~s~ible impli- cations of what is meant by Dr. Michael Novak to constitute a planetary

humanities.

II

One possible concept of a planetary humanities is that- it includes·

within its· connotation the following elements: that the survival of the human species is a value .to be cherished, that individuals as sucJi have an intrinsic value all·their own, that in human experience and histo-·

rical transformation different peoples have arrived at certain values and, principles worthy of mutual adoption (or adaptation) by· other peoples to enrich each other's lives and institutions, and that· these principles can be viewed as representing ultimately a cumulative effort on the part of the human species -for a more cohesive and happier universaL order where particularistic cultural elements· are simply peripheral. The:

basic postulate in all these is that in all man's efforts to bring about what they believe constitutes order and hai:mony, there ·are common

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6 A,SIAN STUDIES .

ingredients of humanity in all of them - elements transcending the iimitations of race,. speech, and geography! But, .indeed, of overriding importance is the survival of the human species in this earth without the sacrificing of any race or segment to achieve this end. Admitted- ly, this is a value. As to the question why this ought to be a value of mankind, neither logic nor empirical philosophy can give a definite answer. Attempts at an answer are found in classical moral philosophy- and certainly in all of th,e great religions.

However, . a planetary humanities as outlined above cannot come into being unless a great part of the world population or at least its intellectual leaders, moral leaders, and academicians develop a conscious~

ness of its fundamental connotations. They must be committed to a form, or order, or cohesion of a world community and possess a sen- timent for what constitutes human expectations believed to be realizable in such an order. A basic assumption here is that human life ought to have some direction or purpose if it is to be worthwhile or significant.

Moreover, as previously hinted, the evolvement of a planetary hu~

manities if it is to have some form of universal sanction must incor- porate within it, albeit transformed to a higher and more universal level- values which. have characterized the great humanistic traditions all over the . world, have stood the test of time, and still continue to maintain their hold on a great part of the world's population. It is here where the various Asian humanistic traditions can play an im- portant and vital role.

The problem of a planetary humanities accommodating· Asian values invites some observations. First of all, values represent reactions or responses of people to certain human and social situations; as ex~

pressed in statements,

they

represent both prescriptions and preferences.

They do not describe facts but rather exemplify human responses to factual situations and needs. Moral, political, and aesthetic judgments pertain to the realm of values. Values represent the human urge to create ordered life both in the individual and the social level. They aim to bring about what is conceived to constitute harmony and hap- piness as a response to biological and other human needs within the framework of some adjustment to the physical and social environment.

A generally systematized group of values accepted by a people within a historical span of time is what may constitute a humanistic tradition.

As such, Asia represents a constellation of different cultural patterns and·

value systems. Some of them might even use similar terms, but the

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connotation or operative character of such terms might differ. What Asian tradition does not value justice, peace, harmony and freedom?

Yet, no different from the Western world, such concepts may not mean exactly the same thing. Moreover, Asian value systems must not be_

viewed as something static or expressive of a philosophy of negativism or resignation. At present, many Asian countries are manifesting a form of social dynamism, and this might be due to the influence of Western values which may have been accepted within the sanction or_

framework of traditional values. Certainly, in various degrees, the ideas of modernism and the need for technological change are affecting

Asian traditional values. .

In trying to locate certain Asian values, it would be wise to be aware that in a given society considered as possessing a particular cul- ture, different but parallel value system may exist side by side. It is well known that a protest against certain religious forms may originate from, or be expressed through, religious outlets. Sufism is an example of this in relation to the kind of Islamic orthodoxy propounded by the legalists. Buddhism is another in relation to Hindu tradition.

In the variety of Asian cultures and humanistic traditions, some are closer to those of the- West- rather than to some other .. Asian ones.

For example, the Islamic humanistic tradition (which is really not mo- nolithic but which exemplifies historical . and .. geographical variations and is not confined to Asia since it predominates in North Africa) has more points of historical . and substantive contacts with the . Western.

tradition than say with Confucianism or Hinduism. The well-known reason for this is that Jesus Christ and many of the other Hebrew prophets have been incorporated into the pantheon of prophets revered by Islam. The belief· here is that the Prophet Muhammad, although the last, belongs to this long series of prophets. Moreover, the lands that initially fell under the sway of Islam were already exposed to the Graeco-Roman tradition and had sizeable Christian communities. Yet one must not disregard one aspect of the Islamic humanistic tradition closely associated with Sufism (or Islamic mystical philosophy) which appears to cross religious borders. It has been recently demonstrated that many of the Sufistic ideas of Ibnul 'Arabi, the Spanish-Arab mys- tical philosopher, have a one-to-one correspondence and even doctrinal

similarity with those of Lao Tzu, the Chinese Taoist ·philosopher. 'The fact that there is no known historical contacts between· these two phi- losophers have led some other mystically-inclined scholars to assert

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8 ASIAN STUDIES

that they all drew their knowledge from a common source that existed during a primordial time - a knowledge which had persisted, with accretions, up to the present. However, more empirically minded scho~

lars would probably comment that man's response to similar situations.

would probably elicit similar questions and answers.

Nevertheless, in spite of the differences between, and even existence of, competing humanistic traditions, it can be stated outrightly that there · is an essential humanity and commonness to all of them. Cultural bor- rowing, the transfer of cultural values from their places of origin to far away places, similar responses of persons belonging to different cultures to similar human or social situations, the communicability of values by persons belonging to different races, creeds, and cultures, and genuine appreciation of artists for art forms produced in another age and clime all attest to the existence of an essential humanity common to all man's traditions. Moreover, in Asian traditions, most of the hu- manistic values have their origin or sanction in religion or are at least based on a metaphysical system (which in many Asian cultures is not entirely devoid of moral prescriptives). Asian religions, philosophical, and mystical systems have assumed the oneness of the human race as well as the sameness of the nature of man. A deeper study of religions will reveal that a one-to-one correspondence between their major con- cepts is possible. All of these generally suggest that many of these values are universal in their intent. This is not to deny that different religions have their differentia, but this might only imply their social function in satisfying particular or local needs.

There is probably no culture that is so poor that other cultures cannot learn something from it. However, the merit of a culture in its contribution to an albeit slowly emerging world culture is, by de- finition, the universality, actual or potenteial, of its key concepts. In the same manner that ideas of modernism, increased standards of living, · and a healthy life should not, in spite of their origin,_ be considered a monopoly of the West, so must a great deal of the humanistic traditions of the different Asian civilizations be considered universal property.

Actually, the diversity of culture should be the very instrument to enrich a future world culture. Allah says in the Qur'an: "0 Man-

kind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another." (Sura XLIX, v.

13). That is, that they may learn from one another.

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It is difficult for any one person to talk authoritatively of all Asian humanistic traditions. But I would like to mention how certain con- cepts of an originally Asian humanistic tradition - that of Islam - can serve as elements of a planetary humanities. One of the basic con- cepts of Islam is that of amanah or trust, that is, Man's life, his family, his property, his intelligence and talents and so on are really not his own but qualities or objects entrusted to him by the Divine. Also, that the earth and the skies around have been given to man for his use but only in the sense of his being a vice-regent on earth. Another concept of Islam is that of community to which a man must sublimate his personal or selfish interests. Undoubtedly, both of these concepts have their parallels in Western political thought. The Qur'an also tries to impress us with the idea that two of the greatest sources of evil in man come from his desire to live forever on earth and to hold absolute power. The original temptation of Adam is succinctly nar- rated as follows: "But the Devil whispered to him, saying: 0 Adam!

Shall I show thee the tree of immortality and power that wasteth not away?" (Sura XX, v. 120). Here can be seen immediately Islamic values of universal import: that since man's life on earth is transient, he is accountable for his actions and must show compassion in his dealings, and that all power on earth is limited and relative and must be exercised as a trust ( amanah). (See Annex, "Notes on the concept of Amanah in Islam").

Also, the Islamic concept that all religions and ethical systems dif- ferent from its own are likewise the result of Divine revelation and that differences in races and nations were meant to enable different peoples :or communities to solve porblems and enrich their lives through spe- cific creative impulses and then learn from each other, demonstrate the supreme virtue of tolerance. Certainly, this virtue is not equivalent to what passes now as religious apathy as an element of a new concept of freedom. Just a few of the values of Islam .that have a universal message have be.en touched upon. Certainly, Judaism, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism (in its various forms), Hinduism, etc., have cor-

responding or similar ideas as well as other ones.

No genuine reconstruction of the present world system regarding the solution of world problems, the sharing of world resources or raw materials, and even political adjustments along a one-world concept is really possible unless there is an a priori acceptance of certain universal values or at least the possibility of these; this is something beyond aca-

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10 ASIAN STUDIES

demic curiosity or mutual . appreciation or even mere. understanding of each other cultures. The awareness of such values may accelerate the expectations of a one-world in proportion to its popularization. among the world population. But here a vicious circle may arise: .not all hu-

man beings will have the same expectations unless they have appro- ximately similar standards of well being. Also, many persons will be inclined to keep their loyalty confined to a nation and not go beyond it if they think that their well being is best secured within it. One tends to be loyal to a system as long as one is a beneficiary of it. Conse- quently, adherence or commitment to a planetary humanities will be greatly determined by its ability to satisfy expectations of the world po-' pulation. The function of world education here is also crucial.

It is not gainsaying to state that there are multitudinous forces to- day that will eventually lead the different countries and peoples of the world to get together to solve common problems if each is to survive.

But again this effort might not necessarily be guided by a common will for the good of all mankind but might only reflect the will for each to survive. Furthermore, if what will make mankind get together involves coercive elements and expedient principles, then the nature of the world's integration would at most be negative in character. What might be necessary is the develop~ent among all individuals and peoples of that kind of will that represents the will for. the good of all

mankind and not just the good of a particular race, nation, or segment.

It is in the development of this will for the good of all mankind as such that the intellectuals, academicians, religious and moral leaders can play an important role. Obviously a key factor in this development is world education.

What might he done initially is to increase translations of the hu- manistic literature of the peoples of this world and widen their accessi- bility not only to the higher centers of learning but to other quarters as well. Curricula in the colleges and universities must offer more li:

'Qeral courses that expose the young to such humanistic" traditions: Phi- losophers or humanists with a good background in philosophy will eventually have to come out with a system demonstrating the equi- valences or correspondences between the basic ideas of these traditions with special concentration on those that have direct import on the value of humanity

is

such and its survival. The results of their labor can then be distributed to various educational agencies in the world such that their influence can be felt in all levels of education including the

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primary ones. Hopefully, a new world generation will arise that will have imbibed of such ideas and, although adhering to their own part- icularistic cultures, will be committed to certain values which will

in

effect constitute a planetary humanities. Consequently, their approaches to world problems will be based on a categorical imperative where humanity will be considered an end in itself.

All of these point to the awesome responsibility for a new breed of intellectuals, academicians, and creative thinkers to accelerate their contacts with one another and unify their vision of a universal or pla- netary humanities. It is a vision that will leave alone the great religions and philosophical systems to their votaries and yet testify to their validity and essential unity. It is a vision that will have as its sanction human- ity as a. whole as well as the survival of humanity with a new well·

thought-out concept of its well-being as a major value;

ANNEX Notes on the Concept of Amanah in Islam

Amanah (trust) is one of the most fundamental concepts in Islam.

The true believer ( mumin) is trustworthy or faithful to the trust.

Since Allah is the Living and the source of all life, a person does not own his life but holds it only in trust. Since Allah is the All-Knowing and the source of all knowledge, a person's intelligen~~ as well as all of his intellectual accomplishments are to be held in trust. All pro- perty, whether legally registered as private or otherwise, belongs to Allah and is, therefore, to be held or utilized by men as a trust. Since Allah is the Owner of All Sovereignty, political power can only be exercised by man as a loan under trust. Indeed, the concept of Amanah has tre-

mendous political, economic and social implications. Knowing some of the Beautiful Names of Allah, which are, in effect, the names of his qualities, the Muslim can readily know what things ultimately belong to Allah, but which are allowed for man's use as a trust.

Clearly, in social life, the idea of Amanah serves as a primary safe- guard against human arbitrarjness while constituting a basis for the rights of persons on other persons and institutions. Its practice connotes the exercise of individual as well as group responsibility. Allah said in the Qur'an: "Lo! We offered the trust unto the heavens and the earth and the halls, but they shrank from bearing it and were afraid of it.

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12 ASIAN STUDIES .

And man assumed it. Lo! he hath proved a tyrant and a fool.'' (Sura XXXIII, v. 72). This verse strongly suggests that when a person mar- ries, raises a family, studies for a degree, practices a profession, owns property, exercises power of different forms, etc., he has entered into certain commitments. But man, in the exercise of any such trust, has often acted irresponsibly. His tyranny results when he uses his in- telligence of purely personal, family or dynastic interest; and his fool- ishness comes about when he believes that he knows everything or can do anything without the help of Allah. Such a tyrant or fool had broken or abused the trust. In effect, he had committed the sin of Pride and had forgotten Allah.

From the Islamic point of view, man is given access to the things of the earth and the skies to facilitate and make more effective his ser- vice to and worship of Allah. That this access must be governed by the principle of Amanah implies that man's actions must be done not for selfish interests or to harm others, but for the good of the greater whole.

In the practical sphere, this greater whole can refer only to the umma, or Muslim community. What is meant here is that the life, strength, in~

telligence, skills, property, etc., of the Muslim must be geared to the wider and greater interests of the umma. A serious study of the Cove- nant ( mithaq) between Allah and the umma as well as a function of the latter in this world, reveal that a purpose, among others, of the Is- lamic community is to serve as a witness to the other religious commu- nities of how the Amanah is to be made manifest and operative in so- cial life. However, all this is not to deny the very important duties and responsibilities of the Muslim to the whole of Mankind since, according to the Qur'an, there is also a Covenant between Allah and Mankind which was implicit when He said to the sons of Adam: "Am I not your Lord?" (Sura VII, v. 172).

Written for the Muslim Educational and Cultural Association (Cornell University)

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E.D. SoLIDUM AND R. DuBsKY

lntrodu~tion

The task of the peace-maker is said to be to prevent major conflicts from arising among nations and to work for conditions of acceptable peace among nations. Whether inspired. by concerns for survival of man or nations or by the Augustinian belief that man by nature strives for a state of peace, conceived as harmony or perfection, the peace·

maker seeks to define various ways or means or to devise some

schem~:s or models by which the task can best be accomplished.

History reveals a great many such schemes whose aim was to state conditions that are necessary for the attainment of international stability of peace. Some schemes have been utopian in character while others have been realistic enough, some even greatly affecting both political thought and political reality.

Among the earliest recorded schemes dealing with peace are those that originated in Asian countries roughly 2,300 years ago. Thus the Confucian conception of a universal commonwealth based on morality or goodness or the Legalist concept of a universal imperial state in China and Kautilya's despotic government aiming at universal conquest in India, however short of modern "internationalism", have at least that much in common. In its own peculiar way, each tried to overcome prevailing conflicts among the "warring states" then, ultimately tried to effect universal peace and greater prosperity. It is interesting to note that the three schemes mentioned were not mere utopian ideas but rather practical schemes (with their idea of imposing a universal he- gemony on other states) and that they all vastly affected then current and subsequent political thought as well as political actuality both in India and in China.

In modern times, a fresh stimulus to seek rational solutions to problems of peace may be said to have originated in 17th century

13

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14 ASIAN STUDIES

Europe with the rise of rationalism.1 Starting roughly with Grotius' attempt to :redefine the universal principles of ;na:turalla,w by:reference to human reasoning alone, a great many rational schemes have appeared.

The overall effect has been to inject a new element of rationality into the relations among nations, to subject such relations to certain inter·

national principles of right.

Some such schemes sought solution to international conflicts in federalism (e.g., the Duke of Sully), yet others in down:r.ight universalism (e.g., Emeric Cruce). Among the better known schemes of this pe- riod were Rouseau's. Project for Perpetual Peace, advocating a· strong central system of government for Europe, and Kant's Eternal Peace reflecting the new liberalism and universalism of the Age of Enlight"

enment, in favor· of free federation of nations. Similar solutions to international conflicts were also manifest in 20th century. thought on

pe~ce. In one scheme, Bertrand Russell, advocated the total surrend- ering of sovereignty. by nations to one strong world government. In another, John Strachey, another English thinker, advocated a kind .of condominium of. two super-powers, America and Russia, obviously un,~

dcr the spell of post-World War II political reality .

. Every age may be vie~ed as _being influenced in its perceptions 'of peace by the conditions of. intermitionallife at t~at _tiple. lf so, our

·current perceptions of international peace may ·be . said to be shaped

!:>y the peculiar experien~e of the 20th century man. Thus we have been affected in our perceptions ·of peace by such factors as the con- flagration of the ·two world wars, the recent rivalry· between two :ideological camp:; .known as the cold war, the enormous advance i:h -modern technology, particularly' military technology, and the develop-

ment of nuclear capacity of certain nations. Suddenly, ·modern military nuclear technology has come to be seen ·as· ha:ving potentially devastating

·effects on all men and ·nations, as threatening the very ·survival of the -htiman race.- It-is· due to these factors that new approaches to solving international conflict situations and ·ensuring peace had to be developed.

Such conc·epts in the current vocabulary of international politics as

"collective security" or "peaceful coexistence" owe .their origin exactly

;t~ the .new c?nditions of international political life.

\ · · 1 See F. S. Northhedge, "Peace, War, and Philosophy" in· the En:.

cyclopedi.a of Philosophy (ed. Paul Edward) New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1967, Vol. 6.

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. The near-universally re~ognized ·agency for maintaining peace_ in the . contemporary world is . the United Nations Organization. It was established after World War II principally in order to maintain peace and to develop conditions favorable to the development of peace. More specifically, as a machinery of peace, it was conceived to accommodate the· need for "collective security" mentioned above, to prevent major conflicts among nations from breaking out, to mediate confliCts ·bet- ween disputing parties or nations as well as to encourage activities or development in particular nations that would presumably be conducive to greater general stability among nations - to universal peace. It may be added that the philosophy behind the idea of the U.N.O. as in- ternational guardian of peace is as much realistic as it is idealistic. It is idealistic in the sense that behind the U.N.O. there appears an underlying optimism and sentiment in favor of universal peace; It is at the same time realistic, in the sense that conflicts are not regarded as abnormal in relations among men and nations and that the ins- trument of war has not been abolished from international· disputes al- together. Still, not all wars are considered as legitimate, but only wars that are undertaken in behalf of justice, to enforce the rights of ma11.

Moreover certain rules of propriety are insisted on in accordance with which hostilities among nations should be permitted to occur only within certain mutually agreed limits and in good faith.

In the following pages, the authors while . freely recognizing the great contribution to peace by the existing U.N. mac.Q.inery for main- taining peace are looking into ways to impr.ove on the present methods of maintaining peace. As we see it, on the existing peace-keeping arrangement, opportunities for peace can only inadequately be exploited and effective peace-keeping is too often made difficult, if not impos-

sible, in practice. Hence we propose to explore a new direction that would conceivably improve the situation. A more effective approach to peace, however, does not imply merely a critical evaluation of the U.N. machinery or transformation of such a machinery. · More than that it implies transformation or a new. focusing of man's perceptions of peace. In our exposition we shall briefly consider these two themes.

More fully, we shall first throw light on some of the weaknesses as these are reflected in our current perceptions of peac~ and in the existing U.N. machinery for peace-keeping. Subsequently, we shall suggest possible remedies for such weaknesses,. which will lead us to state a new paradigm of peace. This paradigm, it will be shown, implies not

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16 ASIAN STUDIES

only re-orientation of our perceptions of peace but also certain struc- tural changes in the international machinery for maintaining peace.

Perceptions of Peace

It is submitted that the problem of finding a workable scheme of international peace is difficult to achieve within the context of contem- porary political practice. The difficulty partly emanates from a di- versity of perceptions of peace. The first such diversity is said to be due to conflictil:\g interests that characterize developing and developed cbuntries.2

In developing colmtries, for example, the perception of peace is shaped by the need of the nation at issue to find stability for its new order at home and recognition as an independent power abroad. These countries are saddled with certain great and fundamental problems on which the very stability, even survival, of the nation depends, such as economic growth, maintenance of law and order within the nation's boundaries, national integration and general social well-being of the citizens, which frequently involve striving after greater social justice and eradication of . poverty in the nation. The perception of peace in developing countries is, then, intimately connected with these ob- jectives, that is, peace depends on the solving of the said problems.

Hence their frequent worship of modernization ·and industrializa- tion, their belief in the need of rapid changes in economic, social and political life. The issue of international peace, or of relation vis-a-vis other nations, must be perceived primarily in terms of the mentioned domestic concerns.

In developed countries, on the other hand, the perception of peace is colored by the relatively prosperous conditions of social life, the re- lative stability that prevails there. Under such conditions peace tends to be identified with the status quo situation which is judged bene- ficial to national interest. Thus the developed countries try to freeze the prevailing international conditions as much as possible, to advocate marginal changes, and to look with suspicion on rapid changes of developing nations, presumably hoping in that way to perpetuate con- ditions most favorable to themselves .

. "'

2 Mohammed Ahsen C}laud.hri; '~Peace Research and Developing Coun- tries," Journal of Peace Researcli;-voL-4, 1968, Oslo.

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It is evident, then, that national perceptions of peace may radi- cally differ depending on the direction in which national interest, so to speak, pulls. Such interests may be complete opposites, such as in case of conflicting economic policies or when the issue of modernization versus status quo is raised. Not surprisingly the leaders of certain de- veloping countries (like in Burma and Indonesia) have become con- vinced that "a lasting and durable world peace remains elusive be- cause of widening gap in income between developed and developing countries." Needless to say, when perceptions of peace differ so widely, they are hard, if not impossible, to reconcile, for they are related to particular experience or outlook of man and are ultimately derived from the more basic difference in social goals and values.

The second diversity in perceptions of peace is of ideological origin.

Ideological theories tend to interpret all reality in terms of certain given categories of thought or belief, to suit their own pre-conceived goals.

Likewise, the issue of peace must suitably be reinterpreted to fit in with the given ideological assumptions. The 1deological dimen- sion of the problem of peace comes out with particular clarity in Marxist theory.

Briefly stated, in Marxist theory the concept of peace is bound up with Marxist historical explanations and with the idea of class struggle as being an inevitable feature of all social life. The Marxist con- cept of peace contains a historical and a class element.3 Concretely, peace is a condition of social life that reflects a relative stability of a ..

particular social system at a particular time. There is, e.g., a "bour·

geois" kind of peace that characterizes bourgeois societies, a "feudal"

peace under favorable conditions of feudalism, etc. Peace as con- ceived in Marxism is then a relativist concept; there is nothing like a permanent, universal peace possible for the class-ridden society (as- Marxism sees it) of today. The term "universal.peace" on Marxist theo- ry is thus but an abstract, "formal" idea, strictly outside the scope of the concrete and historical Marxian. vocabulary. Lastins.s peace will be with people only when classes and states, which are the conditions for. the origins of war, will have withered away.

Another major obstacle to our finding a workable scheme of international peace is due to a certain vagueness that characterizes our .a Karel Kala, "On the Marxist Theory of War and Peace," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 5, 1968, Oslo.

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18 ASIAN STUDIES

current perceptions of peace. Man simply does not appear to have a distinct enough idea of what peace means in a positive sense. We shall explain this point presently. To start with, we may divide people's responses to peace into negative or positive responses. Gal- tung, a prominent researcher of peace, speaks in this connection about

"negative peace" and "positive peace".4 We shall take "negative peace" first for this appears the easier of the two to handle. Briefly, negative peace can be defined as the absence of war or of major inter-·

national conflict situations, in Galtung's phrases, as "the absence of organized forms of violence." We may note that on this definition our perception of peace is essentially a negative perception, i.e., per- ceiving in terms of what peace is not rather than in terms of the con- ditions that characterize peace as such. Now such a negative percep- tion of peace is open to immediat~ criticism. It is admittedly, in one sense, the sharpest and the most precise perception, and the most likely to be acceptable to all parties, but, in another sense it is also the most vague for it fails to tell us what peace actually is or what the positive actions or conditions are by which peace can be accomplished.

To put it differently, it establishes a relation between "non-peace" and the various "non-actions" that have led to "non-peace", but not bet- ween peace as such and the operations or actions that are positively conducive to peace. There is also another sound criticism of the ne- gative perception of peace. With its sharp contrast between peace and

~ conflict, it appears to have a discouraging effect on all conflicb, and so has a built-in conservative bias. It appears to favor non-disturbance of the status quo both at home and in international relations. It tends to advocate law .and order solutions. Yet it may be argned that conflicts need not necessarily be bad whether within nations or in- ternationally for the advancement of nations. They may provide a valuable stimulus for conflict-resolutions and so may ultimately ad- vance the cause of peace in the world. In sum, negative percep- tions of peace are vague, for they lack in positive content, apart from suffering from a conservative bias.

Positive peace implies not merely the absence of something, but rather the presence of something. This something is a particular state of being· which we call peace or, when we perceive it in more

4 John Galtung, as quoted by Herman .Schmid, "Politics and Peace Research," ibid.

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dynamic ways, particular peace-inducing actions. Now it has been contended (by, e.g., Galtung) that our perception of positive peace~

has generally been weak and confused, ·that is both among people:

concerned with politics and among people at large. This is then takeru to imply that such perceptual confusion about peace creates also con-:

fusion among people and nations in peace-oriented efforts or actions and so makes any fruitful pursuit of peace in the world diffict1lt, if not impossible, of achieving. We shall develop this point in more detail.

Perceptions of positive peace are, of course, an experience not un- familar to most men. After all, peace is a good presumably desired' by all men and all men appear to have at least some· idea about peace in their mind. There is, for instance, most likely to be universal cone sent on such ·positive assertions as the idea of peace perceived as the·

state of perfection or the best state of things. This· cart: in turn be identified with such ideas of perceptions as harmony, order, .. reason;

nature, and similar categories. On tl?-is perception, intern·ationaf peace would then be perceived as· a state of international· harmony.

Or on a less elevated level, there is likely to be general consent when•

the perception' of peace is expressed in terms of such idea-s as social justice, the goo~ life, common good_, human happiness ·and

so.

Yet on reflection it becomes immediately dear that perceptions of ·this general kind are not satisfactory ·if our aim is. to arrive at sound and clear perceptions that could serve. as reliable .. guides to peace-directed actions. Their main weakness. is that they ·are too abstract, too vague, too static and ultimately lacking in .operational reference .. They tend to become ineffective when definite actions in behalf of peace are. called for. They tend to dissolve our thinking about peace into -vague ge- neralities and· even to lead to contradictions; · To illustrate .the last point: if peace means the best state of· things,.;; then there should be a great number of different ''best states of things" given the heterogeneity of goals and values in the contemporary world, with some contra- dicting others. In that _case our perceptions of peace are likely -to lead not to harmony of interests but to the opposite, to disharmony!· It is, then, our point that such general perceptions, although not unusual in speculative . thought; are .. not concrete or ·exact enough- whether; for purposes of modern empirical_ political_ science or f~r decisions concern~

ing peace in political practice. · · · · · · ·

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20 ASIAN STUDIES

Our contention that people's perceptions of peace are on the whole ill-formed an4 hazy appears. to have been borne by recent empirical studies. One study aiming to discover reactions . to peace was under~

taken by Trond Alvik among school children in Norway.5 The find- ings of this study indicate that war is most familiar to children while peace elicits fewer responses among them. In other words, they find it easier to perceive war than to perceive peace. Presumably, here the fault is with us and with the ideas of peace that we project. These are usually general or vague, empty of empirical content, that children (and for that matter adults also) have no clear idea how to actually obtain peace.

The mentioned vagueness of perceptions of positive peace "in the abstract" appears to have yet other undesirable effects. Exactly because of its abstract meaning, positive peace invites subjective interpretations or subjective thinking about peace, and subjective thinking, in its turn, is likely to be influenced by political orientation, i.e., to be open to ideological distortions.6 Or alternatively, because they do not lend themselves to ready application, efforts at positive peace may be aban- doned altogether in favor of negative peace. That is, our inability to define or perceive peace in clear and concrete positive terms may ultimately lead us to fall back on the thought of war - on negative peace, despite the difficulties which negative peace itself may have.

Thus distortions and more confusions, more vagueness, may ultimately be the consequence of our positive perceptions of peace in the abstract.

Instead of strengthening the cause of peace in the world, our percep- tions of peace may, then, unwittingly have a mitigating effect on peace.

Our exposition of diverse perceptions of peace has revealed a lack of basic consensus on the meaning or experience of peace. But this does not imply that our diverse perceptio_ns of peace are worthless or unnsable in practice. After all, all the perceptions mentioned do elicit material response of some sort. Our point is merely to show that such responses are not congruent in character, that there is no uni- versal consent on positive peace.

It has also been shown that the lack of consensus on peace may partly be attributed to our current practice to unduly generalize about

5 Trond Alvik, "The Development of Views on Conflict, War, and Peace Among School Children," ibid.

6 Helge Hveem, "Foreign Policy Thinking in the Elite and General Population," ibid.

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peace: It seems that -we have reduced our perceptions of peace to, largely abstract and static ideas and so. have made them difficult to.

relate to the dynamic reality of the ~apidly changing world of today ..

, Having ~uggested the principal weaknesses of current perceptions of peace_ as we see them, we would like briefly to consider the remedies t_hat appe;a;r _ avaj.lable. The principal _remedy, it seems would be to get.

a:way from the· magic circle of abstraction and vagueness that, as we have suggested, appears to dominate today's pe;rceptions of peace. Con~' cretely, itis submitted that what is needed is the strengthening of our perceptions of positive peace or rather of the positive or empirical content in our perception by making these more concrete, more em- pirical, operationally more effective. · '

. · A

cert~:ln reorientation in our thought and practice m~st, it seems~

l?e effected if we are to succeed in our effort of developing a more:

'~real~life" orie.Q.ted sense of peace. First of all, it is clear that such a.

re_allstic approac:P, to peace can never be_ effected by "feeding". people with mere 'general ideas about peace o:r by appeals to abstract rational

~rguments, as this fr~quently has been. the practice today .. Such ge- n.eral ideas are likely tO create unreasonable eipectations about peace th?t will J;~~ain. unreali~ed. in pract~ce. -. Peace Jo. be real or ~or~ las~

tirig ·must· grow out of real experien~es of. man,_ must_ be .familiar to_

man's own personal experience. We should, then, approach peace from the bottom of the ladder of international relations rather than from the top. . More specifically, we should concern ourselves first with peace- building. peace-making or peace-keeping on a local or regional level rather than on a "universal" level, as presumably the UN. aims at, such as through cooperation on regional level in matters of common so- cial, economic and cultural interests, by learning to solve the problems of peace at our doorsteps: In this way the perception of positive peace - would in time acquire

a

new dimet1sion or significance, and neither children of Norway nor adults in other countr-ies would likely be at a loss· when asked to say what positive peace means to them.

'f!nited N'atz'on! Peace-Keeping

The second great obstacle to our finding

a

workable schem:e of international peace has to do with -the present-day machinery of peace-.

keeping organizations. In the present· seCtion we shall try to identify this obstacle; suggesting what is "wrong" with" today's. institutional

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22 ASIAN STUDIES

peace arrangements or at least what makes such arrangements less effective than they conceivably could be. But first we shall give a brief account of the reasons why such institutional arrangement are needed, to dispell the idea that the world can somehow get along with- out them. What is ultimately proposed is not getting rid of an in- ternational machinery for peace keeping altogether, but rather to trans- form the structure and some of the assumptions and methods of the existing machinery.

Institutional peace arrangements may be said to originate in si- tuations of inter-state conflicts. These arise when the interest or goal of one nation, such as national security or economic development, is inconsistent with, or in direct conflict with, the interests or goals of other nations. Every single country tries to stabilize its position and to extend its sphere of interest in the world. With that aim in mind, it mobilizes its power, and other resources or acts in such a way as to affect the conduct of other nations in a manner advantageous to itself. This is normally accomplished by such measures as formation of alliances, regional security arrangements, a deliberate policy of mu- tual cooperation with certain friendly nations, pursuit of a "balance of power" policy, etc. The idea behind all such measures is to nar- row the area of potential conflicts or, to express it differently, to re- duce potential conflicts to manageable proportions.

It is clear that the ideal inter-state relations is to eradicate as much as possible major conflict situations, which might lead to un- manageable frictions, even to war. Still, it may be argued that con- flicts will always remain as an unavoidable feature of international life and that they m~ even do some good. It may be contended that no state exists without experiencing some amount of conflict. For there are certain problems that appear sufficiently universal and ever-recurring that make a perfect functioning of the world in the foreseeable future at least; near impossible "of achieving. We may think of such problems as arise out of differences in ideological interests, out of economic pro- blems (due, e.g., to raw materials, oil), new technological problems (such as, e.g., affect the current aJ]ns race), new social problems (such as have to do with malnutrition or education) or simply arising out of certain uncontrollable factors, such as drought, floods, famine. It is obvious that problems

like

these do not lend themselves to easy rational solutions and that they are likely to remain always with us to haunt the present-day social planner. Needless to say, they cannot but have

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an upsetting effect on the relatipn among nations, being alway~ a source of potential conflicts among nations, even of a .serious kind. We mayl even argue that conflicts need not . be necessarily bad or fatal to rela-.

tionships among states. On the contrary, we may see them as paving stimulating effects. Situations without conflict would presumably in- volve static, unchanging conditions. But change is generally wanted, hence some degree of conflict is likely to be beneficial and will pro-l vide the dynamism called for in effecting changes. What is im-' portant, of course, is that conflicts do not ex~eed certain limits, that.

they do not lead to irreconcilable differences of interest between twoi nations, or groups of nations. Extreme conflicts would. make these a potential source of. war-producing situations.

With ever-present conflicts in the world, some machinery for re-~

clueing inter-state conflicts, or at least the major conflicts, . appear~ ne- cessary if our intention is to have the world function in a reasonably rational and orderly manner. Here such peace~keeping organizations as-the old League of Nations or the United Nations Organization. of today have come into existence to fulfill exactly such a task. . They have been established to . deal particularly with conflicts that are of a more serious character, .to effect specific settlements of international disputes, allegedly, so as to create a favorable climate for the existence of a lasting international peace.

It is not our purpose in this paper to describe the machinery or institutional structure of the U.N. having to do with peace keeping.

Our purpose here is rather to critically evaluate the effectiveness of such machinery to see vihether it is, particularly today, a "workable"

or effective instrument for what it has been established - peace keepi?g· · The great contribution of the United Nations peace keeping rna-, chinery since its inception after World War II fannot be underrated.

It has to its credit for instance such ·significant actions (however cri-, tically they have frequently been received by some parties) as resolving major threats to international peace· in Korea, the Middle East and~

Congo. Moreover, the. United Nations Organization has ·provided· a·

valuable forum for discussing out~tanding international conflicts, which by itself has descalated tensions, reduced the scope of such confl~cts-:

Still, the machinery of peace keeping has been increasingly criticized.

~s lacking in eff~ctivenc;ss · .arid as not too well suited ~to' the _realit~s, of present-day world .. : With increasing frequency, we hear:. yoic~~

Pigura

Table  7  provides  a  summary  means  of  comparing  the  soCial  dis.:.

Mga Sanggunian

NAUUGNAY NA DOKUMENTO

While the national situation is still at peace, not to mention the limited timeframe to accomplish the goal, it is advisable that the government would quickly implement the strategy.6